On a recent trip to the Middle East I had the opportunity to meet with many Israelis and Palestinians from all walks of life including high government officials, settlers and members of the Peace Now movement. I also met with academics, poll takers, journalists, former military and intelligence personnel, and scores of other ordinary people. Paradoxically, while repeated polls confirm that a majority (between 68 and 72 percent) of Israelis and Palestinians seek peace based on a two-state solution, no such unity exists between the various groups and factions who continue to promote their own agenda regardless of the consensus of the majority. What I heard and saw simply reconfirmed the profound lack of political cohesiveness within both Israeli and Palestinian communities.

Political factionalism coupled with intense personal rivalry too often prevents majority support of one leader or party. This is the case for Netanyahu's coalition with Shas, Yisrael Betanu and other right wing elements just as it is for Mahmoud Abbas' support within Fatah and with Hamas. More alarming is that while disconnect within each community persists; there is still a misperception between Israelis and Palestinians about each other's national aspirations, requirements and ultimate intentions. Too many Arabs and Israelis remain highly suspicious and oblivious to each other‘s psychological dispositions. Yet with a significant majority of Israelis and Palestinians in favor of a two-state solution with peace and normal relations, why then there is no national drive in either camp to push for a solution? The answer may be attributed to the following:

First, both sides generally have little faith in their own leadership's ability to deliver peace with security and dignity anytime soon. Israelis and Palestinians lack determined, visionary and courageous leaders. In Israel, the nature of a coalition government often prevents the Prime Minister to rise above the fray and take decisive measures toward peace without risking the collapse of the government. While Netanyahu's coalition represents a majority within the Knesset, it by no means represents the overwhelming number of Israelis who are ready for a leader who can maintain a united government and deliver peace.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, suffer from a chronic factionalism making it impossible for a leader to make the necessary concessions without risking his position of power. Mahmoud Abbas is meant to represent the moderates, although most moderates have a hard time fully backing him because he has been unable to achieve any significant gains for them. Hamas' charter-which calls for Israel's destruction-is both offensive and intolerable to Israel and much of the international community, yet they are far more organized and enjoy popular grassroots support in Gaza. Without reconciling the political agenda of these two groups, Israel and the US will not have a strong partner with which to negotiate. Moreover, both sides often use this internal division and lack of consensus as an excuse for inflexibility.

Second, many Israeli and Palestinian leaders still feel that more time may further improve their position and lead to more concessions, hence they argue against ‘rushing' into any agreement. This is coupled with strong rejectionist elements in both camps. In Israel there are those who still seek "Greater Israel" especially among the settlers. On the Palestinians side there are several groups, such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas, who want all of mandated Palestine including Israel. They believe if they cannot take it by force then they can wait and use demographics to overwhelm the Jewish majority; as the idea of a one state solution has began to gain some currency among Palestinian radicals.

Third, neither the Israeli nor Palestinian government has been preparing the public over the years for the inevitability of peaceful coexistence based on a two-state solution. Whereas Israeli officials talk about the lack of a worthy Palestinian interlocutor and complain about continued violence perpetrated against Israel, the Palestinian media and public condemnations of Israel continue to incite the public against Israel, often using venomous language that makes the possibility of coexistence seem beyond repair.

Fourth, both sides are wrapped up in a tit-for-tat process where neither party wants to show its cards first. Both remain internally conflicted as to how far they can go to accommodate each other while maintaining the upper hand in negotiations. For example, on the surface it appears that the Israeli government would not compromise on the future unity of Jerusalem as "Israel's eternal capital" while the Palestinians would presumably not compromise on the issue of the right of return of the refugees. In reality however, both sides have substantially modified their positions and reached agreements in principle on both of these critical issues in previous negotiations.

Lastly, there has not been consistent pressure exerted from the outside to prompt both Israelis and Palestinians to settle their differences. Although the United States has exerted some effort over many years, it was neither consistent nor did it display the leadership needed to bring parties together to forge peace. The Clinton and the Bush administrations focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict largely at the eleventh hour of their presidencies. The US has failed to assert itself as the most influential power, and has too often allowed excessive violence to severely undermine the peace process as happened during the second Intifada under the Bush administration's watch between years 2000 and 2006. The Arab states too have often used the Palestinian plight to cover for their domestic failures. It is only in the past few years that some Arab states have put forth a concerted effort to advance the Arab Peace Initiative that calls for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Although historical in its dimensions and implications, the Initiative remains static because neither side is ready or willing to translate it into a real peace process.

Considering this paradoxical reality, both Israelis and Palestinians have shown that they are simply incapable of resolving this conflict on their own. This is why the Obama administration must pursue an aggressive political agenda with unwavering commitment to produce concessions from all sides to provide the basis for an agreement. The United States cannot equivocate with the Israelis, the Palestinians or the Arab states as to what is required to forge a lasting peace. But for peace to occur, the Obama administration must secure a number of prerequisites to avoid the pitfalls of previous administrations and capitalize on the changing political environment in the Middle East especially among the Arab states that favor peace with Israel.

Ending the Settlements Expansion:

Ending the settlements expansion is one of the most critical elements in changing the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. More than anything else the settlements send a clear message that Israel has no intention of seriously relinquishing territory and that the idea of a two state solution is dead. If Israel were to stop expansion, it could strengthen Mahmoud Abbas' hand as he would be able to claim credit for an extraordinary Israeli concession. To resolve the conflict on this issue between the Obama administration and Israel, both sides must agree on a moratorium for a specific period of time (instead of an open-ended freeze) pending a resolution to the borders dispute. The expansion can then be resumed on the settlements that would be incorporated into Israel proper by agreement with the Palestinians. The Israeli government must also control the settlers currently residing in the West Bank who have on a number of occasions resorted to violence against the Palestinians. In return for an Israeli cooperation and a moratorium on the settlements, the Obama administration must demand and receive from the Palestinian Authority an immediate cessation of all incitements against Israel in the Palestinian media, especially those in Arabic. This must include the revision of text books, as is being promoted by the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East. Moreover, although violent attacks against Israel have been reduced dramatically since the Gaza war, the PA must demonstrably continue to take whatever action needed to prevent future acts of violence. In addition, the PA must undertake a major public relations campaign to foster the virtues of peaceful coexistence with Israel.

Promoting a Palestinian Unity Government:

Establishing a unity government remains central to promoting a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. The Obama administration must exert tremendous pressure on Egypt and Saudi Arabia to do everything in their power to advance a unity government between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Every effort must be made to pressure Hamas to accept the Arab Peace Initiative. It is unlikely that Hamas will abandon their charter and recognize Israel outright; therefore, accepting the Arab Peace Initiative as an act of solidarity with the 22 Arab states may allow its leadership to save face. It would also allow Israel and the US to come to an indirect agreement with Hamas should they start looking seriously at the Arab Peace Initiative as a viable framework for peace. Having been substantially weakened by the Israeli Gaza offensive late last year, the continuing closure of border crossings and the growing disenchantment of its policies by Palestinians in Gaza and other Arab states, Hamas may now be more inclined to forge a unity government than at any time before. Moreover, Hamas' leadership seems more open to discuss a two-state solution in order to have a say in the peace process. Otherwise, the growing chasm between Hamas and the PA will not serve the interest of any of the players in the conflict and will only perpetuate the possibility of large scale violence.

Reducing Tension in the Territories:

Although there has been significant progress in the West Bank and the Palestinians are enjoying greater freedom and relative economic prosperity, Israel can do considerably more to make the life for the Palestinians in the West Bank easier. Israel moreover, must further strengthen Mahmoud Abbas. Israel cannot weaken Abbas, and then blame him for being weak and inconsequential. Israel should continue to remove scores of road blocks, release thousands of prisoners and allow thousands more Palestinians to work in Israel. These concessions should be awarded to Mahmoud Abbas as a triumph and result of negotiations. Israel must also grant more construction tenders to Palestinians living in overcrowded housing that need to build schools and housing units. Between years 2000 and 2007 a meager 91 construction permits were given to Palestinians in West Bank while 18,472 housing units were built for Israeli settlers in the same area, which can only breed more resentment. Changing this status quo will first and foremost strengthen Abbas in the eyes of ordinary Palestinians and allow him to make important concessions to Israel especially in connection with border adjustments and the issue of Palestinian refugees. In addition, these efforts would further bolster Abbas in his negotiations with Hamas to form a unity government as he can demonstrate that he is the more effective interlocutor with the Israelis. Finally, Israeli concessions will help to create the contrast in the quality of life and personal freedoms for Palestinians in the West Bank, to demonstrate that moderation pays and is rewarded.

Translating the Arab Peace Initiative into Confidence-Building Measures:

The Obama administration must persuade the Arab states to translate the Arab Peace Initiative into confidence building measures. Such an historic document that calls on Israel to return territories captured in 1967 for peace while finding a just solution to the Palestinian refugees is not only momentous but provides the foundation for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. In a recent Op Ed in the Washington Post, The Crown Prince of Bahrain, Shaikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa expanded on the necessity for Arabs to back the Peace Initiative in a more robust way: "We must stop the small minded waiting game in which each side refuses to budge until the other side makes the first move, we've got to be bigger than that. All sides need to take simultaneous good-faith action if peace is to have a chance." The Arab states for example can take specific actions, however symbolic, such as allowing Israeli passengers and cargo aircraft to fly over Arab territory, opening trade offices in Arab states other than Jordan and Egypt, holding cultural exchanges and lifting the ban on Arab officials from meeting with their Israeli counterparts to demonstrate their sincerity behind the Initiative.

Jordan and Egypt, as designated by the Arab League to promote the Initiative, must also start to take greater gestures to garner support for it from the Israeli people. Their representatives should make it clear to the Israeli public that the Arab Peace Initiative is a framework for negotiations and a comprehensive peace, and is not simply a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Those Arab states who do not yet have diplomatic relations with Israel should back Jordan in Egypt in these efforts and be seen as publicly supporting a large-scale Arab effort to win over the Israeli public.

Israelis too need to be more proactive in their support for the Arab Peace Initiative to counter what has been seen as a tepid government response thus far. The academics, former military and intelligence officials and ex-ambassadors who discuss and support the Initiative in their offices and private meetings need to take on a more public presence to make this dialogue resonate with the Israeli street.

It should be noted that the Arab Sunni states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan have a grave concern over Iran's nuclear program and want to put the Arab-Israeli conflict behind them in order to focus on Tehran's threat. They should be far more in tune to make important concessions to Israel at this juncture as they view Israel as ultimately the best defense against Iran's nuclear ambitions. To assuage the Israelis, US Secretary of Defense Bob Gates and the Obama administration will need to work closely with Israel on the Iranian threat and consequently be in a better position to coax the Israelis to embrace the Arab Peace Initiative.

Advancing the Israeli-Syrian Peace Process:

Advancing the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations has to be part and parcel of Obama's peace offensive. Syria holds the key to regional stability and enjoys a very important geo-strategic position with far reaching regional implications. Although the Obama administration seems to be leaning toward an Israeli-Palestinian accommodation first, it must pursue the Israeli-Syrian track with the same tenacity. Peace between Israel and Syria will have serious ramifications on Damascus' influence over Hamas, Hezbollah and its relationship with Iran and consequently could facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. The current post-election domestic strife in Iran is of particular note, as Syria may reconsider its strategic alliance with Iran while it is in a state of turmoil. Israel's deep concerns over Iran's nuclear program should encourage its government to focus on Syria. Indeed, the way to distance Iran from the Mediterranean is to distance Syria from Iran, and that can happen only when Israel comes to the conclusion that peace with Syria is more valuable than the Golan Heights. Focus groups of settlers in the Golan Heights have stated their willingness to leave their homes if it would mean peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and yet Netanyahu and his advisors are still stalling on moving forward with the Syria track. Syria is willing to resume the negotiations with Israel from where it was left under Turkish mediation with the Olmert government. Israel, on the other hand wants to restart the talks unconditionally with no regard to any prior understanding. For these reasons, the Obama administration must bring whatever pressure necessary to bear on Israel to reach an accord with Syria. In return, Damascus must unequivocally demonstrate that peace with Israel remains Syria's strategic option and the leadership is prepared to fully embrace complete normalizations of relations with Israel.

Staying the Course:

The question now is will the Obama administration stay the course? This will be a key test in judging the US credibility on the ground, as this conflict has outlived countless US attempts at reconciliation that were too short lived or lacked the political capital necessary to reach an agreement. Having started his peace offensive on day one of his administration President Obama has shown his commitment to finding a solution. He must now demonstrate his resolve to stay the course. The Obama administration must expend tremendous political capital, at least initially, to achieve the tangible results that the 62-year-old intractable conflict will require. President Obama himself must remain relentless as both the Israelis and the Palestinians will continue to check and test his resolve. He must demonstrate evenhandedness in his demands from both Israelis and Palestinians without necessarily compromising America's commitment to Israel's national security. Moreover, President Obama must up the ante on his public relations offensive in Israel to extol the virtue of a two-state solution. He must explain why the administration is investing so much political capital behind its push for peace. Both the Israeli and Palestinian public must be made fully aware about what the enormous benefits are and what would be the price of failure. The Israeli public will not tolerate a government that alienates the United States, which they view as an indispensable guarantor for their national security. Orchestrated pressure on Netanyahu and Abbas will also provide both leaders the political cover they need to make the necessary concessions for peace.

The Obama administration cannot retreat in the face of Israeli or Arab resistance because the price of failure will be unacceptable in a region that is critical to America's strategic interests and President Obama's ability to lead. Deferring the peace process will not offer a respite for reassessment but a prelude for unimaginable violent escalation of the conflict from which only the detractors of peace can reap the greatest benefit.

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This essay has been published in various forms by the following journals:

International Journal on World Peace
Vol. XXVI No. 1 March 2009

American Diplomacy
February, 2009

Digest of Middle East Studies (DOMES)
Spring 2009

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This essay appears courtesy of the Palestine-Israel Journal, where it is featured in their current issue "The Refugee Question
Vol 15 No. 4 & Vol 16 No. 1, 08/09."

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This essay has been published in various forms by the following journals: 

International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO) – December 2008 

Middle East Policy – Spring 2009

One of the most momentous declarations to come out of the Arab world since Israel's inception in 1948 is the Arab Peace Initiative, launched in March 2002 in Beirut, Lebanon, and re-adopted by the Arab League in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in March 2007. It would be tragic to allow the Initiative to languish as it offers a solid promise for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Moreover, the Arab Peace Initiative has the potential to tackle the extremism that has engulfed the Middle East to the detriment of both Israel and the Arab states.

Essentially, the Initiative calls on Israel to agree to full withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967; to arrive at a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, and to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as the capital. The demands made by the Arab Peace Initiative can be fully reconciled with Israel's core requirements for peace, which are: 1) ensuring Israel's national security and territorial integrity, 2) sustaining Israel's Jewish national identity, 3) securing the unity of Jerusalem as Israel's capital while accommodating the Palestinian demands, and 4) establishing normal relations with the entire Arab world. Failure to embrace the Initiative by Israel and the new US administration will send a dangerous message that neither country is fully invested in ending the debilitating 60-year old Arab-Israeli conflict.

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This essay has been published in various forms by the following journals: 

American Diplomacy – July  2008

The Globalist – July 2008

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal – Aug 2008 

Strategic Insights – September 2008

International Journal on World Peace – December 2008

In this paper, which is primarily addressed to the Israelis, I am suggesting a way to build trust in this conflict.

A Brief Background
I will first make a few points of description:

Trust: The Word and Definition
The English term "trust" shares its root with nouns such as "truth" – and "truce", and has to do with predictability, reliability, and risk, indicating the voluntary giving up on conventional control on the other party.³ Trust may thus be defined, among other definitions, as:

• 1 Nation A trusts nation B in a particular situation when it believes that B will not further its own interests at the expense of A, usually because A believes that B values the prospects of long-run cooperation between the two countries more than it values the short-run gains that would accrue by exploiting its immediate power over A.⁴

• 2 A bet about the future contingent actions of others."⁵
• 3 "The generalized expectation that the other will handle his freedom in keeping with … the personality which he has presented and made socially visible."⁶ "It is strongly associated with risk, both as a problematic situation, and as a means to solve it, by reducing its complexity.⁷

Arabic has several nouns to indicate "trust": amÁnah, the root of which indicates quiet and tranquility.  The word itself is associated with compacts or covenants; wafÁÞ, thiqah, and iÔmiÞnÁn. Their opposites are khiyÁnah, ghadr,(Lane: contradiction of wafÁÞ); makr, nifÁq (which is associated with matters religious; Lane); and Ýadam al-thiqah.⁸

The "trust" addressed in this paper both enables and accompanies substantive moves between Palestinians and Israelis.

History of Mistrust
The most recent phase in the crystallization of mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians was in the aftermath of the negotiations at Oslo, 1993, Camp David, 2000, Sharm al-Sheikh, and Tabah in late 2000, all of which were followed by the intifada. Both sides failed to live up to their commitments, signifying a sign of mutual untrustworthiness.⁹

Concern of untrustworthiness from the Palestinian side, for example, started with Ehud Barak as Prime Minister of Israel.  He started his term as a distrusted prime minister due to composition in his government and his positions on Jerusalem and the settlements.¹⁰ This mistrust, as well as that on Barak's part, has never been corrected, and contributed greatly towards the eventual collapse of the Oslo peace talks.

This sort of mistrust appears to be rational and founded on relevant evidence on the ground. Other mistrusts, which originated much earlier in history are more fundamental, and have no less influence on contemporary attitudes. These rest on the Qur'an as well as on formative events, such as the Prophet Muhammad's suspicion of the Jewish QainuqÁÝ tribe in Medinah that led him to attack them.¹¹ Generally, the Jews are often depicted in Islamic texts as treacherous, a depiction which is transmitted in Islamic educational systems to date.¹²

For some religious Muslims, negotiating with Israel compels them to make a choice between trusting the Jews/Israelis, and loyalty to the trust that God has put in them.

These two kinds of mistrust are mirrored on the Israeli side both on the political and factual level and on the religio-cultural-historical one: "Esau hates Jacob"; "Ishma'el a wild ass of a man, his hand against everyone and the hand of everyone against him."¹³ Drawing on the scriptures in matters of trust, therefore, more often than not, renders building it an act against the word of God, and thus out of the question. God's word is always right on principle, and it may also be easily evidenced by historical events properly interpreted.

Analysis
In putting trust in another party, one starts from a present situation, and fits the other party's interests, and into it and the desired and acceptable outcomes. Determining the true interests of the other party is the task of the trusting party, who must also take into consideration that the other party's declarations about interests may not reflect the truth. In order to be able to carry this out, not only "objective" analysis must be exercised but especially acquaintance with the "subjective" approach of the other party.

Some distinctions are in order: the first is between the group and the individual level;¹⁴ the second is between placing and receiving trust; and the third is between the short and the long run.

Trust is easier to build on the personal than on the collective level, and the methods that serve for the former are often inadequate for the latter. Still, the two can hardly be divorced from one another. Both levels share, to a large extent, the quality of being culture-dependent.  On the individual level, this dependence is manifested basically in manners of one-on-one conduct, whereas in the collective, basic concepts, history, and education establish the efficacy of confidence building measures (CBMs).

Secondly, while putting trust in another party is a matter of one's own will, reached by decisions based on interpretation of factual experience, receiving it is entirely dependent on the other party.

Viewing the two as automatically bound together is a common mistake, a mistake made by Barak in a September 5, 1999 speech in the Knesset following the Sharm agreement. In the speech, he indicated that among the results of the conference trust was restored between the sides; although even with Arafat, Barak had never reached any level of trust. In fact, Arikat expressed the hope that Camp David would be an opportunity to restore the below-zero trust between the two sides, but as some Americans sensed, that was not to be.¹⁵ Even if trust were to have been reached between the two personalities, transmitting it to both publics would have been a different matter all together.

Thirdly, although building trust for the long run rests on having acquired it in the short run, aiming for eternal trust may be detrimental for practical results.

Evaluation
Trust has more to do with a combination of an irrational leap and rationally studied evidence than with an exclusive, rational, interest-based process.¹⁶ Obviously, these aspects of trust are more culture-oriented than "pure" rationality.

This is one of the reasons that rebuilding trust is a difficult operation, and may well be an impossible task. Each party waits for the other to take the initiative; and when one does, it only does so in anticipation of an immediate and favorable response. Failure on the part of the other side to perform as anticipated contributes to increased suspicion towards it. An escalating process is thus promoted, which accompanies and emphasizes the one that reigns due to the conflict itself. Rebuilding trust, on the other hand, may, perhaps, be viewed as an act that aims at creating a positive escalation.¹⁷

However, experience and analysis show that the chances for trust building by employing conventional attitudes and methods are minuscule. I should, therefore, like to suggest a different approach.

Proposal

Hypotheses

The following proposal rests on a number of hypotheses:

• 1 Trust, at least on a minimal level, is desirable by both parties although mistrust has its advantages, especially under severe adversarial situations.¹⁸ This is so, if not in the short run, then in the longer run.
• 2 One of the reasons that the Israelis need trust is that unlike the situation at the end of WWII, Israel was not an absolute victor who can dictate conditions.
• 3 It is hypothesized in this paper that all the considerations have already been made and a decision was reached to work towards achieving trust with the Palestinians. The paper concentrates on the "how?" rather than on "whether to?" It will also avoid the issue of "what to do with trust once it is achieved?"
• 4 Trust needs to be built in the general public rather than exclusively in the leadership and/or negotiators.
• 5 Lessons could be drawn from other disciplines, including psychology, where trust plays an important role, particularly in treating phobias, rebuilding trust after spousal infidelity, or recreating trusting relations between parents and their children.

Restructuring risk-management
On the basis of these, I should make the following suggestion: An attempt to rebuild trust, to the very limited extent that it has ever existed between Palestinians and Israelis, must be undertaken with a long-term approach. It must also be understood that taking the initiative on building trust does not constitute the acceptance of any responsibility, let alone, blame for matters in controversy.

In building trust, risk cannot be avoided. It can, however, be re-framed.  Building trust, if it is objective at all, is done through the same channels that are used for issues of substance in a conflict. In such channels, once the initiator has taken the first step, he or she awaits for the other to reciprocate so as to evaluate the risk he has just taken. His or her next step is conditioned on such reciprocation, a process that could be described as vertical. The advantage as well as the disadvantage of such conduct lies in the danger of severing negotiations (both of substance and of building trust) in case of disappointment.

This proposal suggests a horizontally structured risk taking, which offers far greater flexibility. One channel is exclusively allocated for building trust, and it is to be carried on regardless of developments on the ground. On the other hand, other channels which deal with issues of substance must be highly sensitive to such developments, and if need be cut; or else, the process risks further negative escalation.¹⁹

Thus, the proposed process consists of at least three main stages, which ideally would follow one another in time.  However, in the case at hand, the stages have to be run simultaneously:

• 1 Unilateral steps²⁰
• 2 Track III
• 3 Tracks I and II

Stages

• 1. Unilateral Stage

The principles for the first and most important stage in rebuilding trust,  (unlike trust creating) are: 1) Unilaterality,²¹ 2) Unconditionality, 3) Graduality, 4) Realism, 5) Calibration to culture, 6) Simultaneity, and 7) Confidentiality.

One of the common-sense conditions for placing trust is mutuality.²² On the other hand, as the policy of unilateral steps has already gained a foothold in the region's politics, albeit in military and political issues, employing it in the matter of trust ought not be inconceivable. Let Israel (with or without the Palestinians, independently of each other) declare full trustworthiness in a very limited geographical region, on a very limited issue (olive trees or a small neighborhood, for instance), for a very limited period of time (a week, for example). By the end of the above period, the step offer may be continued without waiting for reciprocation on the part of the Palestinians. Further steps could extend beyond one or more of the variables. Unlike the unilateral action taken by Israel to withdraw from Lebanon or Gaza, this proposal calls for a continuous unilateralism.

The unilateral step must not be confined to a timetable because this would constitute a conditioning of sort. The basic fault in confidence building measures behavior is that it is conditional.²³ In order to overcome this fault, it is proposed that further steps should not be conditioned on direct reciprocity on the part of the Palestinian, thus simplifying and making the need for overt and mutual communication unnecessary.²⁴

It is important to emphasize that unconditional altruism is by no means suggested.²⁵ The proposal does not call on Israel to abandon all other channels of action, but rather to try and break the vicious bond of conditioning in a very restricted domain, time-frame, and locality on a single and restricted channel.

Unlike Barak's approach of setting timetable and aiming at solving the conflict in one big bang (that includes unprecedented concessions), I am of the opinion that at least, in the domain of forging trust, action cannot be but extremely gradual. In that it shares methods with some psychological means of treating broken trust and phobias. The latter sometimes exercises very gradual desensitization: with every step the patient is led closer to his/her source of fear in order to calm him in preparation for the next step.

Similarly, attempts at persuading one party of the other's complete and eternal, trustworthiness are doomed to failure and harming to other more realistic objectives. Therefore, non-utopian expectations should be envisaged, and the trust sought temporal, necessitating constant grooming. One means in such treatment can be ‘benevolent misperception', i.e., a tendency to minimize differences and beliefs, or at least behave as though one believes in the opponent's good intentions."²⁶

Traditionally, trustworthiness is of great importance in Islamic culture, as it is strongly connected with faith, and is considered a safeguard against any calmity. Its importance is also indicated by the belief that, along with shame, it will be the first thing that will be removed from the nation of Islam on the road of deterioration should God decide to punish them.²⁷

As one of the risks of any CBM, and for that matter, of any step taken between any two or more humans, let alone who belong to different cultures, is that of misinterpretation or ignoring.  It is of essence that intentions be made clear by employing the tools of the other culture.

Unfortunately, the history of the conflict is abundant with such cases, e.g., the release of three prisoners as a gesture towards the Palestinians in preparation for the summit meeting in July, 2000. This action was perceived by them as an insult, whose damage outbalanced any benefit that would have been obtained by a more substantial release. Trust was also thwarted by "peripheral" reasons such as personal conduct or leaking the contents of the negotiations.  This was the case during the Camp David talks, according to Sher.²⁸

Cultural considerations should include precedents, models, literary works, verbal expressions, proverbs, the ability to calibrate explicitness, manners, and knowledge of timing and choice of representatives. This is particularly important as it is the people and not only the leaders or representatives with whom Israel seeks to establish a degree of trust.

In the present case, Islam plays a major role, and must be taken in consideration. Trust (wafÁÞ), an institution held by Islam in great esteem, is sometimes defined as "stable and permanent love for the [trusted] until his death, and then for his children and friends."²⁹

On the other hand, relating to the future as if it were knowable to and able to be influenced by humans is strongly opposed to by Islam. Suffice it to recall the prohibition on making any utterance about the future without adding the istithnÁÞ.³⁰ If, therefore, as Luhmann puts it "to show trust is to anticipate the future. It is to behave as though the future were certain", then putting trust in anything but God could be questionable on religious grounds.³¹ Besides this apprehension regarding the future, Islam also prohibits the believer to take risks³², primarily in financial matters (gharar; salÁm contracts), but in other domains as well.³³

The opposite of trust, i.e., treachery and betrayal, are condemned in the Quran: "Betray not Allah and His messenger, nor knowingly betray your trusts."³⁴ A person who betrays trust is a hypocrite, a very loaded term in Islam.³⁵ The loss of trust (amÁnah) is one of the signs of the hour of judgment.³⁶

But it is not only on religious grounds that Arabic culture, like all other cultures, cautions against trust, especially when one's enemy presents their better profile to one: "The gentler your enemy's conduct towards you, the more cautious you must be. Security against one's enemy lies in distancing oneself from, and closing-off (inqibÁÃ) from him, as it is by befriending and trust that you enable him to fight you."³⁷

Two main stumbling blocks must be recognized. First, mistrust is of such magnitude that any action by the other party may be interpreted as corroborating it. Even if this should not be the general reaction, there will be individuals and groups on both sides who will push this interpretation home to people. One of the means to doing so is to accuse those who may agree to attempt collaboration of treason or stupidity.

The newly formed political party Kadima that came to power under Olmert's leadership quickly finds itself on the defensive following the Lebanon debacle. Although withdrawal from much of the West Bank, unilaterally or through negotiations, is the party's principle tenet, no withdrawal is currently contemplated. Instead, violence between Israel and the Palestinians escalates, especially following the abduction of the Israeli soldier Shalit. Meanwhile, the occupation continues to dehumanize both sides, with no new initiative or prospects for any major breakthrough in the offing to end this consuming conflict.

If withdrawal from the territories seemed a good idea when the Kadima party was created, it is even more so now. Withdrawal must occur under any formula that Israel can work out–as long as its national security is not compromised–with the international community, especially the quartet of the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia. Meanwhile, Mr. Olmert needs to send clear signals that he remains committed to the idea of ending the occupation and begin to rebuild trust by: a) making it abundantly clear that he will not tolerate the building of illegal outposts and  will dismantle all existing ones, b) ending the expansion of existing settlements with only minor exceptions, c) providing economic incentives and sustainable development projects to Palestinian communities that do not engage in violent activity, d) removing all road blocks that are not absolutely critical to Israel‘s security, e) allowing Palestinians to legitimately build, plant, and develop their land with no undue restrictions, f) forsaking any form of collective punishment and, finally, g) releasing all prisoners who came from Palestinian communities that have not been actively engaged in violence. With or without the support of the Palestinian Authority and regardless of the Authority's political convictions, Israel must build positive inroads into the Palestinian community because; in the final analysis, Israelis and Palestinians must co-exist.

• 2. Track III

Once a reaction, even a minimally positive one is received from the Palestinians to the unilateral steps, the second stage may be introduced.  This would form the third track. The objective of this track is the common creation of a longer-range trust between the peoples rather than only between leaders or negotiators, although the latter is a sine qua non for the former.

This can be attempted by establishing the rules of the tracks.  The following are some suggestions in this process. The track will continue independently of anything that happens outside of it; there should be no timetable, no sanctions, and no leaks during meetings; and conduct should be according to both cultures. It is assumed that if there is even little trust to start with, the track may work, provided the rules are kept.

Among other topics that track III would tackle are the history, culture, mutual acquaintance, implementation of effective CBM, and advising leaders of the parties that conducting tracks II and I. Given the sensitivities, it is recommended that a third party, perhaps Jordan, would take the lead of this stage.

It is of the essence not to aim too high. If indeed mutual mistrust is so basic to the relationship between the parties, and if it has to do with their integrity, perhaps efforts should be made to transform lack of trust into respect for competence.³⁸

• 3. Track II and I

Negotiators in tracks II and I should deal with matters of substance and be independent of, and oblivious to, the steps in track III. This suggested process will stand better chances of success if it is conducted confidentially. It will be up to the leaders to navigate between these tracks and decide the moment when they are to be joined. Thus track III, the trust-rebuilding track, is intended to precede, enable and then accompany tracks II and I. 

Conclusion
Often behavior creates perception. Since neither side can afford holding the future hostage until full trust is struck, this proposal suggests acting, very cautiously, as though some has already been achieved. It suggests that Israel should take unilateral steps in this regard, with the principles of unconditionality, graduality, realism, calibration to culture, and confidentiality, until the other party is ready to reciprocate. Then, a third track should start whose sole objective will be to restore some mutual trust. Simultaneously with track III, tracks II and I should continue dealing with substantial matters. In such a way, long-term trust building will not be held hostage to daily events.  This gradual process would create a stable and reliable channel between the parties.

Notes

• 1 I would like to thank the following people for their counsel: As'ad Busoul, David Kipper, Neil Weiner and Northwestern University's School of Education and Social Policy for their hospitality.
• 2 Beilin, Yossi. (2001). Madrikh le-Yonah Petsuah. Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot. p.96
• 3 Rubin, J. A. & G. Levinger (1995)."Levels of Analysis in Search of Generalizable Knowledge." In: Bunker, B. B., J. Z. Rubin and Associates (Eds.) (1995). Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice. San Francisco: Jossey_Bass Publishers. Pp. 13-38.
• 4 Jervis, Robert. (1976). Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.44
• 5 Sztompka, Piotr. (2000). Trust: A Sociological Theory. Port Chester, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, p.25
• 6 Luhman, Niklas. (1979). Trust; and, Power: two Works. Chichester; New York : Wiley, p. 39
• 7 Luhmann, Niklas. (1988). ‘‘Familiarity, confidence, trust: problems and alternatives,'' in: D. Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.95; Luhman, Niklas. (1979). Trust; and, Power: two Works. Chichester; New York: Wiley, p. 71
• 8 Lane, Edward William (1968). An Arabic­English Lexicon (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1863; Repr. Beirut: Librairie du Liban; KhiyÁnah is defined by Lane as "to be unfaithful to the confidence or trust that he reposed in him."
• 9 Rothstein, Robert. L. (2002). "A Fraglie Peace: Could a ‘Race to the Bottom' Have Been Avoided?", in: Rothstein, Robert. L., Moshe Ma'oz, and Khalil Shikaki (Eds.). The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure; Perspectives, Predicaments, and Prospects. Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press. P. 1; Hassassian, Manuel. (2002). "Why Did Oslo Fail? Lessons for the Future." in: Rothstein, Robert. L., Moshe Ma'oz, and Khalil Shikaki (Eds.). The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure; Perspectives, Predicaments, and Prospects. Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press. P. 120.
• 10 Malley, Robert, and Husseun Agha. (2001). "The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond." Journal of Palestine Studies, 31:1, pp. 72.
• 11 Qur'an 2:100; Tabari, Tafsir to VII:86, in connection with the verse "If you apprehend treachery from any people (with whom you have a treaty), retaliate by breaking off (relations) with them." (8:58).
• 12 E.g., Saudi History of the Muslim State, Grade 5, (2001) pp. 29-30; Biography of the Prophet and History of the Orthodox Caliphs, Grade 7, (2000) p. 52; Dictation, Grade 8, pt. 1 (2000) p. 24. http://ajc.org/InTheMedia/PublicationsPrint.asp?did=750.
• 13 (Rashi's commentary on Gen. 33:4); (Gen, 16:12)
• 14 Luhmann states clearly "Trust is extended first and foremost to another human being." (1979, 39). See further distinction in the literature of personal trust, distinction is made between deterrence-based, knowledge-based, and identification-based trust (Fisman and Khanna, 2000, quoting Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin, 1992).
• 15 Sher, Gilad (2001). Bemerhak Negi'ah (Just Beyond Reach: The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations 1999-2001). Israel: Hemed. The Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv is reported to have said that Arafat always complained to president Mubarak about Barak's untrustworthiness (Sher, 2001, 135).
• 16 Among others, Möllering, G. (2001). "The Nature of Trust: from Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation, and Suspension." Sociology, 35:2, pp. 403-420. On the rational component of CBM ("enlightened self-interest without regard to the hostility between the parties to the conflict"), see Ben-Dor, Gabriel and Dewitt, 1994, 5. Even more adamant for rationality of CBM's is Adelman, 1994, 314 who enumerates the following as assumptions of the institution: "An indifference to values"; "Priority of instrumental rationality"; "A shared basic value attributed to survival"; "A presumption of a shared communication and operational norms, and, in the end, perhaps a Kantian good will …"
• 17 Escalation is sometimes viewed as retaliation for unilateral steps taken by the opponent [Alon, N. & Omer, H. (in press): Combatting Demonization: Skills for Furthering Acceptance and Reducing Escalation (Chapter 4). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, p.3], thus it is the main vice, turning it into the positive one might create the positive escalation.
• 18 (Alon & Omer, in press, 8)
• 19 (Alon & Omer, in press, 11, quoting Bateson, 1972; Orford, 1986 on "complementary", and "symmetrical" escalation); The mix of resistance with reconciliation has also been shown to reduce escalation. See de Waal, 1993; Weinblatt, 2004, 2005." (quoted in Alon & Omer, in press, 13).
• 20 During this phase, an address must be provided by the side that takes the unilateral steps for the other to react, without anticipating, let alone, conditioning on it.
• 21 The proposal agrees with Ross's definition (Ross, Marc Howard. (1993). The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press, p.101): "Unilateral action" involves one party taking steps to further what is views as its interests", even if it is not adverserialy motivated.
• 22 Luhmann, 1979, 42: "The process demands mutual commitment and can only be put to the test by both sides becoming involved in it, in a fixed order, first the truster and then the trusted."
• 23 See Adelman, Howard. (1994). "Towards a Confidence Transfornational Dynamic." In: Ben-Dor, Gabriel and David B. Dewitt. (Eds.) (1994). Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press. Pp. 311-332, especially tables on pages 317 and 323, where values, tools, and goals, and the three schools of CBM's are depicted respectively.
• 24 (Luhmann, 1979, 43)
• 25 For the relative efficacy of conditional and unconditional altruism see Clark, Kenneth and Sefton, Martin. (2001)."The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation." Economic Journal, 111/468. Pp. 51-51.
• 26 (Ross, 1993, 106, quoting Deutsch, 1973:364).
• 27 Ibn Abi al-Dunya, Abd Allah ibn Muhammad, 823-894 (1973). KitÁb MakÁrim al-AkhlÁq. (The noble qualities of character), Ed. James A. Bellamy. Wiesbaden, F. Steiner.
• 28 (Sher, 2001, 127) (Sher 2001, 25)
• 29 (GhazÁlī, ÀdÁb, 289)
• 30 (Quran, 18:23-24)
• 31 (Luhmann 1979, 10)
• 32 Luhmann, 1979, 42: "[One] must invest in … a risky investment. … It must be possible for the partner to abuse the trust."
• 33 Although some argue that "the disapprobation of the practice would appear to relate less to material concerns than to the general Muslim preoccupation with the concept of Muruwah" Rayner, Susan E. (1991). The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law: a Comparative Analysis with Particular Reference to the Modern Legislation in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. London; Boston: Graham & Trotman.
• 34 (Quran, 27:8)
• 35 (GhazÁlī, ÀdÁb, 337; Ibn Abī al-DunyÁ, MakÁrim 116-117/144)
• 36 (BukhÁrÐ, ÑaÎÐÎ, ‛Ilm, 3)
• 37 (e.g., Ibn ÝAbd Rabbihi, ÝIqd (1940), I, 214ff.)
• 38 For the distinction and its implications in organizations, see Kim, Peter, Donald L. Ferrin, Cecily D. Cooper, and Kurt T. Dirks. (2004). "Removing the Shadow of Suspicion: The Effects of Apology Versus Denial for Repairing Competence Versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations." Journal of applied Psychology, vol. 89, No. 1, 104-118.

The years of Nazi ferocity left many millions of Jews disillusioned, scarred, and frightened. Yet the years of redemption generated intense mixtures of hope and anxiety, courage and fear, confidence and uncertainty. The realization that even Jews could now proclaim liberty and political independence was so overwhelming that it evoked mystical feelings. Many Jews came to believe that some transcendent exchange, some divine compensation was decreed: six million Jews perished so thai", the remnant could live. One-third of all Jewry was sacrificed on the altar of man's insanity so that the survivors could find a sanctuary, build a home, and at long last, live in dignity and with self-respect.

Although such a notion may have been accepted by a limited number of Jews who survived the Holocaust, the majority, however, believed that one of the main effects of the Holocaust was to accelerate the establishment of Israel. Yet the price was exorbitant; it was a price that left hundreds of thousands of Jews emotionally drained and psychologically traumatized. The creation of the State of Israel did very little to alter their condition. Deep within their hearts, these disillusioned but determined Jews believed that Israel would have been established eventually, with or without the Holocaust. After all, Jews had yearned for statehood for more than 2,000 years: what would another two or three decades have mattered?

There was a mystery here: perhaps the same one that surrounded the survival of the Jews throughout millennia. A powerless and dispersed people, subjected to unending traumas defying all rationality, have withstood history's most turbulent time, and they have not only managed to survive, but to survive in style. The survival of the Jew, however, is not a historical accident. It is nothing less than a testimonial to the Jews's vigilance, his ability to adapt to situations, his commitment to help and care about others, his thirst for knowledge, his refusal to accept what appeared to be inevitable, and finally, his resolve to rely on his own resources and not to die in vain.

Although Jews may remain scapegoats and anti-Semitism may persist, together they provide a constant reminder to Jews and their detractors that Jewish survival transcends human grasp and may remain a mystery. The Holocaust was intended to defy that historical mystery. It was engineered to provide a solution–a "final" solution– to the Jewish "problem." The best German minds were assembled to execute a plan that would revoke the Jewish presence, erase the Jewish past, and make continued Jewish existence impossible.

The Holocaust was designed to obliterate Jews, thereby ending, once and for all, their mysterious existence and stubborn will to survive. The Holocaust was therefore a deliberate act to eradicate the Jewish body. The failure of the Germans was not limited to their inability to physically eliminate every Jew, but that the Jewish body was survived by the Jewish idea.

Judaism, as a way of life, as a philosophy, as a culture could not and would not have been destroyed. It was those ideals which Jewishness withholds that makes Jewish existence beyond the reach of any antagonist. As such, the Holocaust came to symbolize Jewish resiliency and formidable inner strength and therefore it cannot be–a cause for redemption. It must always be remembered, however, as the symbol of a stigma – an ascribed human stigma–from which there is no absolution.

The Ideals of Redemption

The question that faces us today is how should we go about the process of redemption–the creation of a strong and wholesome Jewish existence–and at the same time, discourage future antagonists from perpetrating another Holocaust upon us. In this context, what is the role of the State oflsrael and how can we reconcile the centrality of Israel with continued Jewish dispersion? And how will that impact upon redemption itself? The first tangible evidence of redemption was the re-establishment of the State of Israel. Here, on the ancient land of Israel, the Jews were expected by their own religious and historical orientation and beliefs to produce a great national culture which would gradually produce a "new" Jewish personality. This distinct Jewish personality would be assertive and self-confident, free of immemorial burdens of subordination and second-class citizenship.

To maximize the development of this new Jewish character, a Jewish State had to be established only in the promised land of Israel. Furthermore, it became an article of dogma among some Zionists that a Jew's potential could not be fully attained unless he lived within this state. In fact, the environment of a Jewish State would not only offer the new Jew a natural habitat, but would also encourage, complement, and instill in him a set of values.

In the land of Israel, it was accepted, the Jew feels closest to God; in the land of Israel, he enters into a partnership with God; and only in the land of Israel can a Jew achieve his goals and fulfill his true destiny. Thus, Israel was posited not only as an answer to the plight of the Jews, but also as the clear and unmitigated expression of his cultural and religious experience and psychological and emotional rejuvenation. In this sense, the state comes to be seen as the prime requisite to the process of complete and total redemption.

These, then, were the principal expectations of the soul-redeeming process. Indeed, the early years of Israeli statehood can be seen as a golden era of spiritual rejuvenation, an era during which Jews, both inside and outside of Israel, began to view their individuality in a different light. Self-esteem, pride, self-assurance, a new sense of responsibility, renewed hope, and much higher expectations all further strengthened their unity and solidarity. The national fever was overwhelming; the commitment to sacrifice and build overshadowed the danger posed by the Arab states. The will of the people and their national purpose emerged as the most formidable weapons the Jew ever possessed.

It was on the basis of this self-reevaluation of the Jewish character that the partnership between diaspora Jewry and the State of Israel was woven. The Jewish State was now seen as a model society, one that stood for justice, equality, and freedom. It was viewed as the center from which spiritual, emotional, and intellectual fulfillment could be derived. The Israelis were expected to be an example to the world by maintaining the highest levels of moral and ethical conduct. Purity of mind and spirit was expected to guide Israel's leaders and its people- a perfect and just society in a perfect environment and at a perfect junction in the history of mankind.

To be sure, the redemption had to be wholesome, invigorating, and complete. Israel could not be compared with any other country. It had to develop a distinct national character and personality and to protect and preserve its own values within socio-economic and political structures developed at its own pace and time.

In this view, Israel was expected to provide the answer to the "Jewish problem." After all, this was the foremost consideration in the minds of Israel's creators. Once the unwanted, disinherited, and persecuted Jew had emigrated from alien soil and returned to his true homeland, his psychological and emotional well-being would be restored and his former hosts, be they friends or foes, would be relieved of their "burden."

The Expectations Fall Short

Although the first two decades of statehood gave considerable credence to these expectations, with the advent of the third decade, Jewish intellectuals and spiritual leaders began to voice some skepticism. The redemption of the Jews, solely through the creation of the state, was not possible. For the majority of Jews who continued to live in the diaspora, Israel could not provide total fulfillment. Although Israel, as a political institution, provided some psychological security for diaspora Jews, their survival remained largely beyond the scope of Israel and its promise.

Both dormant and activist Jews saw in their orientation a greater measure of survivability; that is, Israel was viewed as a high premium insurance policy that would give certain coverage after the injury had already occurred rather than as a shield to prevent injury in the first place. Although diaspora Jews believe deeply in Israel's importance as a cultural and inspirational source, they are fully entrenched in their own milieu and take pride in their contributions to Jewish communal and civic life of their respective countries of residence.

The establishment of a new and free Jewish society in Israel did not liberate the Jew entirely from the "galut", the diaspora, mentality. The regeneration of Jewish communal life remained a combination of diaspora and statehood, each simultaneously pushing and pulling in opposite directions. The diaspora's consciousness formed the basis for Jewish communal life. In this respect, Israel failed to provide a cohesive and compelling program by which its cultural developments could be transmitted to the many scores of communities that yearned for a renewed sense of fulfillment.

In fact, Israel, to a great extent, was a divisive element in the practice of religion and in the end, provided a poor model for both political and organizational conduct. Moreover, Israel was unable to become the spiritual center for the Jewish people, that center which is the true pillar of redemption. Finally, Israel's economic conditions made the country appear more dependent on outside help which further weakened its ability to draw greater numbers of Jews into its fold. The problem was further compounded by the greater attraction of the United States.(The Soviet Jewish drop-outs are a case in point.) Moreover, it was also recognized by diaspora intellectuals that if there was an historic goal to the process of redemption, the Jewish diaspora must play an independent role today, as it did in the past. Although peripheral at times, it should still play an active role. Jewish continuity, they reasoned, is not static: separate Jewish creativity and growth is fundamental to Jewish continuity. Although there may be an intrinsic relationship between creativity and the land of Israel, this association does not necessarily mean that the Jews' presence on the land is a necessary precondition for Jewish creativity and continuity. Insofar as diaspora Jews remain an ideological minority, their intellectual activism and contribution should not only be tolerated, but actively sought.

Although the reality of Israel, as witnessed by diaspora Jewry, was inconsistent with initial expectations, diaspora Jews now have come to realize that a certain equation between Israel and world Jewry must be drawn. Certainly, neither side could derive its entire psychological, emotional, cultural, and intellectual needs exclusively from the other. Although the exchange between them became a cornerstone to their normal functioning as free entities, each side developed its own special and unique needs.

The fulfillment of these became the main requisite for their independent and interdependent survival. This recognition further led diaspora intellectuals to play a critical role not only in promoting their special interests, but also in extending their sphere of influence or even interfering in matters of exclusive concern to Israel. This newly adopted attitude was predicated on a variety of common interests shared by both diaspora Jewry and Israel, but primarily on the fact that Israel's conduct and the consequences of that conduct are no longer limited to its own boundaries.

Who is a Jew?

The question of who is a Jew recently brought into focus the essence of the Israel-diaspora relationship. In an effort to form a coalition government after the last election in Israel, the heads of the two leading parties, Likud and Labor, competed vigorously to lure the religious parties into a narrow coalition government. Realizing their importance, the religious parties set out to extract every conceivable concession, the most egregious being the redefinition of what constitutes a Jew, an act which would require an amendment of the Law of Return. In effect, this could have invalidated all conversions to Judaism performed by Conservative or Reform rabbis especially in the U.S.

There was nothing new in the religious parties' quest for such an amendment. Throughout Israel's existence the question of who is a Jew has been debated constantly. The religious parties were consistent in their demands. However, the two leading parties had always resisted these demands, fearing an uproar by American Jews and by those Israelis afraid that such an act would undermine Israel's character as a home for all Jews regardless of their religious affiliation.

For the last four decades, the religious parties have worked very diligently to move Israel toward greater orthodoxy. They have always viewed themselves as religiously pure and the only ones fit to be the true keepers of the faith and caretakers of the holy places. To that end, they extracted a wide range of concessions from each leading party in exchange for joining a coalition government.

These concessions have included government funding for religious education, strict sabbath observance, religious control of marriage and divorce laws, exemption from military service, and maintenance of kashrut in public eating places. Then, at the risk of disenfranchising Reform and Conservative Jews, they insisted on redefining who is a Jew. If such an amendment had passed, it would have given the religious parties a complete monopoly on the interpretation of Judaism and moved Israel closer toward an autocratic state.

Who is a Jew? Since when is Jewish identity, many American Jews asked, a political issue? The question of Jewish identity touches the very heart of Judaism. No political party or coalition of parties inside or outside Israel has the right to redefine or amend a law that could affect the lives of diaspora Jewry. By raising the question in a political context, those who supported such an act, in fact, have exposed themselves as nothing less than hypocrites.

Jewish identity, American Jewish leaders maintained, is not a commodity to be traded by Israel's political merchants; it is not a property to be sold in the murky exchange of Israel's politics. How sad that in their zealous grasp for power, Israeli politicians have managed to reduce Jewish rootedness to political expediency. In the final analysis, they have surrendered the riches of the Jewish faith to the whims of fanatics and in the process, have sacrificed Israel's standing as a democratic secular state in which all religious denominations can flourish and thrive.

American Reform and Conservative Jews, whose religious standing was in question, had every right to be indignant. They felt betrayed, disowned, and disinherited. The passage of such a law, they rightfully insisted, would have made every convert to Judaism feel like a mamzer (bastard) in the eyes of everything he most cherishes. The rift between diaspora Jewry and Israel would have become real, anger and rage would have set in, barriers would have been built inadvertently and the prospect of disintegration would have loomed so high. For the American Reform and Conservative movements this runs not only against the principle of redemption, but it would have rendered the whole concept hollow.

Although the number affected would not have been great, what irked the American Jewish community is that Israel was questioning, in fact, who is a rabbi and what are the parameters of their practices. Such an amendment would run against the principle on which the whole idea of redemption rests. Many who have converted to Judaism have done so with much pain and anguish. Some have had to endure ridicule; others were rebuked and criticized by friends and family. But they all embraced Judaism with passion.

To them it was coming home to the warmth of a spiritual hearth. They did not join a cult or a clique; they found a universe of human experience. To them and to every enlightened Jew, all branches of Judaism are equal. None can dominate nor dictate to the others and certainly, none can invalidate a Reform or Conservative conversion. Such an act would have been nothing less than an assault on their faith, a ruthless attack on their legitimacy, an affront to their dignity and a deep injury to their pride.

The whole debacle over the issue of who is a Jew and the intense controversy that surrounded it ought to provide a constructive lesson. For indeed, as Jews continue to traverse the treacherous road of salvation and redemption they must realize that the danger to their existence as Jews and the danger to Judaism itself emanates from within. When Jews begin to doubt each other, when they infringe upon each other's inherent rights, when fanaticism of any color sets in, when narrow self-interest becomes the order of the day and alienation marks Jews, not only will they self-destruct, but they invite new detractors to test their will and right.

Jews who are destined to live in constant dispersion must reach for each other, must maintain the common thread of Judaism in its infinite expanse and its boundless breadth. Nothing is more perilous to Judaism than self-consuming fanaticism and the blind pursuit of self-centered objectives no matter how noble they may seem to those who seek them. The Law of Return grants any Jew Israeli citizenship, a place under the sun. The law is not a gift but a right–the right to come to the shores of Israel, the right of every Jew to live free, the right to be a devout or a moderate, Conservative or Reform or just the right to be–a Jew. These are the tenents of redemption.

Those who try to tamper with our religious affiliation simply because it does not conform with theirs must not forget the time when being a Jew was a crime. Our assailants asked not who was a Jew by birth, who was Orthodox, who was not. They did not ask who was converted by a Reform or Conservative rabbi and who followed tradition to the dot. Yes, we were equal in the eyes of our persecutors–yet sadly, are not so in the eyes of our brothers and sisters. And yet, everyone felt he was a Jew, too.

Israeli and diaspora leaders will remember from this sad episode that Israel was created to answer the call. Israel was built to provide a home. Israel is the base of our ingathering, the symbol of our salvation and the core of our faith. Israel is the refuge to which we can turn. It symbolizes the totality of Jewish experience and exemplifies the entire Jewish body. Every organ of Jewish existence has its function, every movement and organization has its mission. None can usurp the other. For in the end, all streams of Judaism must forever flow freely to reach the height that God bestowed on both Judaism and Jerusalem.

The Palestinian Dilemma

Another issue that could cause dire consequences for both Israel and diaspora Jewry and for the whole process of redemption is the seemingly intractable Palestinian crisis. In this respect, the blame may be placed on the laps of both camps. Israel's efforts to persuade the American Jewish community that a Palestinian state on the West Bank will present a mortal danger to Israel had succeeded in leaving a deep impression. In fact, many American Jews have become violently vocal in their opposition to any peaceful overture toward the Palestinians that includes even a semblance of territorial concession.

"How can we trust the Arabs?" they maintain. "Now they (the PLO) want to regain the West Bank and Gaza. The next step will be Jaffa and Tel Aviv." "If they don't want to live under Israeli rule, they should leave and if they continue to cause trouble, they should be expelled."

What is disturbing is the inability of these vocal groups to grasp that the Palestinians harbor the same distrust. Palestinians fear that Israel's ultimate goal is to establish "greater Israel" and render them completely and indefinitely homeless.

Caught between the historically tragic experiences of oppression, persecution, and expulsions which culminated in the Holocaust, and the desire for security and safety, many Israeli and American Jews understandably feel uncertain and anxious about the future. This is also why these Jews who espouse the extreme right position refuse to accept the changing realities of the Middle East: five wars, the rise of the PLO as the sole accepted representative of the Palestinian people, peace between Israel and Egypt, and finally, the uprisings in the occupied territories have introduced entirely new military, political, and psychological dimensions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Territory for peace is no longer one of many options but the only option that can meet the national aspirations of both Palestinians and Israelis.

Mutual suspicion and distrust runs deep. It has obscured any sense of proportion and to some extent, blinded both sides to the simple truth. What are the options? Can Israel continue to rule the West Bank and the Gaza Strip indefinitely and expect a whole generation of Palestinians to give up in despair? What kind of state will Israel become? Is this the Zionist dream? Can the Israelis expel over one and a half million Palestinians? Does it not run against the moral grain of the vast majority of Jews? Wouldn't that dangerously undermine the whole concept of redemption?

Neither the Likud nor Labor Party has ever advocated expulsion en masse. This extremist minority living in Israel and the U.S. who claim total commitment to Israel's future well-being can afford to suggest such drastic measures as long as it is someone else who is forced to perpetrate this travesty upon other people.

Those who advocate annexation of the territories without considering the demographic ramifications are committing as great an error as those who advocate expulsion. Annexation will convert Israel into a binational state within two decades. If Israel offers political equality to the Palestinians, it will lose its Jewish identity. If Israel insists on retaining its Jewish identity, it will lose its democratic character. It cannot be both ways.

There is growing anguish among American Jews over the course of the Palestinian uprising. Every time a Palestinian or Israeli Jew is killed or maimed, another brick is added to the wall of hatred and suspicion that separates two peoples who are destined to live together. And that is tragic.

What can be done to allow the Palestinians self-determination without compromising Israel's security? The two are not mutually exclusive. Nor is a Palestinian independent entity necessarily a mortal danger to Israel. The greatest danger to Israel comes not from the Palestinians, but from within–from vacillation and equivocation, from severe economic dislocation, from social schism and from a lack of unity of purpose. The danger to Israel is compounded by those Jews, inside and outside Israel, who are prisoners of the past. Those who advocate an iron fist policy and prepared to doom another generation of Israelis and Palestinians to hatred and distrust.

An Added Dimension

The process of redemption, as symbolized by the creation of Israel, has now been given an added dimension–diaspora Jewry–which emerged to complete the cycle. World Jewry's partnership with Israel has thus moved from a position of passive receipt to one of active participation. Both sides came to the conclusion that the process of Jewish redemption cannot be limited to Israel. Israel, envisioned as a model of a perfect society, simply could not live up to such an unrealistic expectation. Instead, constant feedback, mutually constructive criticism, and active participation are all necessary to reach greater heights and deeper meaning in the interaction between the two sides.

One other aspect must be noted: Jewish national reconstruction has been subject to the forces of secularization and modernization. Although these forces were and are not incompatible with the process of redemption, they have affected a large segment of diaspora Jewry. The effect was noticeable within the U.S. Jewish community, whose members suffered neither from a "push," nor were attracted to Israel by a 'pull.' Thus, the lack of a strong cultural center in Israel inadvertently precipitated the loss of Jewish identity among many young Jews.

During this transitional period, Jews have suffered and will continue to suffer heavy casualties. Spiritual alienation is on the rise, intermarriage has reached unprecedented proportions, and disenchantment with Jewish communal life has become routine. Israel, unfortunately, has lost its innate attractiveness and the flavor of a supposedly dynamic society. Military victories no longer impress young Jews. Certainly, the relationship between the two camps, which had been one of the utmost confidence and mutual respect, has become turbulent and often very disappointing and discouraging. Finally, after four decades of rapid change, uncertainty, and political and ideological infighting, both camps realize their own and each other's shortcomings and have begun to take a new and hard look at the reality of the "redeemed" Jew.

Yet, this counterpoint of disillusionment and reassessment has yielded benefits. The partnership was given a renewed chance for reevaluation, crucially, by the acceptance of the basic premise that redemption is not limited to a single Jewish center, including Israel.

If Jewish survival is viewed as a phenomenon which has defied time, place, and reason, Jerusalem was and still is the very essence of that defiance. In times of great Jewish achievements and crushing failures, in times of high hope and exhausting despair, and in times of great yearning and total fulfillment, Jerusalem remained at the emotional center of Jewish life.

It is only fitting, therefore, that Jerusalem resume its proper place in the heart and soul of every Jew. Whenever a Jew thinks of "defiance" in Jewish history, Jerusalem immediately comes to mind. Indeed, Jerusalem has defied time, man, and all natural and social forces. For Jews, Jerusalem is the beginning and the end, the means and the purpose, the foundation on which the Jewish faith and hopes have rested through ages. Currently, Jerusalem is still a key element in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Israel's position, however, has never been open to misinterpretation. Jerusalem will remain Israel's capital forever, indivisible, a city unified by its hopes and dreams and where Jews, Arabs, and Christians can live together in peace and enjoy absolute freedom of worship.

To better understand the Israeli position and why Israelis, regardless of their political affiliations, stand united on the question of Jerusalem, a brief historical survey is warranted.

Jewish presence in Jerusalem was first recorded during the Canaanite period (3000-1200 BCE). The king of Canaan complained in a letter to the Pharaoh about the Haibiru (Hebrew) invaders and noted that he and other kings who were loyal to the Pharaoh were attempting to resist them. In the book of Joshua (10: Iff), it is recorded that the Amorite king of Jerusalem led a coalition of Amorite leaders who fought against Joshua at Gibeon. When Canaan was separated into tribal divisions, Jerusalem was assigned to Benjamin (Josh. 15:8:18-16). It remained, however, a Jebusite city under David's rule. This early period of Jerusalem left its mark on the Jews. By the time of David's rule, the Jews could not conceive a statehood without Jerusalem.

Recent archeological excavations and passages from the Old Testament (II Samuel 5:6ff and I Chronicles 1 l:4ff) provide clear evidence that the Jews inhabited Jerusalem before and during the First Temple period (1200-586 BCE). David captured Jerusalem and transformed it into the national Jewish capital. By moving the ark of God from Kiriath Jearim to Jerusalem, David established Jerusalem as the City of God and the religious and political heart of Israel.

King Solomon built the First Temple and a royal palace, thereby transforming Jerusalem into both a holy city and a secular center. The kings of Judah ruled after Solomon's death, during which time Jerusalem served as the capital of the smaller kingdom of Judah. After the Babylonian army seized Jerusalem, the ruler Nebuzaradan expelled most of its citizens and set fire to the Temple and to their homes (587 BCE). The Jews, however, remained in Jerusalem, despite the royal edict. By now, Jerusalem had become indispensible to normative Jewish religion and psychology.

The Second Temple period (586 BCE-70 CE) began after the fall of Babylon. King Cyrus of Persia issued a decree permitting those who wished to return to Zion and rebuild their Temple to do so. Consequently, many Jews returned to build the Second Temple. Jerusalem was clearly recognized by King Cyrus as the religious center of the Jews.

During the Hasmonean era of the second Temple period, Judah Maccabee led the insurrection that resulted in the recapture of Jerusalem. The Jews regained the Temple Mount and eliminated pagan objects from the Temple. The successors to King Antiochus IV gave the Jews religious freedom. For many inhabitants of the land of Israel who were not previously exposed to Judaism, the Temple in Jerusalem became the new center of religious life. In 70 CE, Titus destroyed the Second Temple.

During much of the Roman period (70-324 CE), most of Jerusalem lay in ruins. However, the Jews had as many as seven synagogues in or within the periphery of Jerusalem. After the second Roman-Jewish war, the Jews recaptured Jerusalem and established a provisional Temple. The Jews temporarily ruled from 132 to 135 CE, when the Romans reoccupied the city. Although the Emperor Hadrian declared that any circumcised male found in Jerusalem would be killed, the Jews continued to inhabit the city in defiance of the Roman decree.

During the Byzantine period (324-637), Jews were still prohibited from entering Jerusalem. Only on the ninth of Av were they allowed to pray on the Temple Mount. Even though the Jews were prohibited from residing in Jerusalem, their religious rights were recognized. The Emperor Julian rebuilt the Temple, and the Empress Eudicua terminated the edict forbidding the Jews from residing in Jerusalem. Jewish inhabitants of the city assisted the Persians in defeating the Byzantines in the Byzantine-Persian War of 614. In return for their cooperation, the Persians allowed the Jews to rule the city. Nehemiah governed Jerusalem until the return of the city to the Byzantines (629), at which time most of the Jews were again exiled. Some, however, remained in Jerusalem.

The Byzantines ruled Jerusalem until 638, when they finally surrendered to the Caliph Omar. During the Arab period (638-1099) the Jews were still officially prohibited from living in Jerusalem. Yet many sources confirm that the Umayyad Caliph Omar had Jewish advisers, who were responsible for maintaining local order. However, he transformed the Temple into a place of Moslem worship. A document found in the Cairo Genizah leaves no doubt that Jews inhabited Jerusalem during the Persian conquest (614-628) and that they requested permission from Omar for 200 more families to immigrate to Jerusalem. Omar allowed 70 more Jewish settlers to enter the city.

A twelfth century source, Abraham ben Hiyya, reveals that at this time there were seven synagogues and a midrash (religious college) near the Temple. During the Umayyad period of Arab rule, Jews enjoyed religious freedom. Abd al-Malik even appointed some Jews as guardians of the harem and exempted them from the poll tax. Moreover, Jews were free to practice their religion during the reign of the Abbasid caliphs. Moslem fanaticism, however, increased during Fatimid rule (969-1071), and particularly under the Caliph al- Hakim. The Jews were persecuted and the conditions of relative religious freedom were terminated. Genizah sources record that the Jews had poor living conditions and were forced to pay high taxes and duties.

Yet despite these adversities, Jewish religious and cultural life remained rich. On holidays, Jewish pilgrims gathered on the Mount of Olives. The Karaites, who began to immigrate to Jerusalem during the 9th century, had many authors, scholars, and spiritual leaders among them, such as Salmon ben Jeroham and Sahl ben Mazliah, who did notable research in the Hebrew language and wrote commentaries on the Bible.

The Crusader period (1099-1260) commenced when the Crusaders attacked Jerusalem and massacred many Jews. Many of those killed were praying in synagogues set on fire by the Crusaders. Although the Jews were officially prohibited once again from dwelling in Jerusalem, some inhabited an area near the Citadel. Benjamin of Tudela wrote that he encountered Jewish dyers when visiting Jerusalem. After Saladin conquered Jerusalem in the Battle of Hattin in 1187, he invited more Jews to settle in the city. Jews from Maghreb, Yemen, and Europe soon immigrated to Jerusalem.

The Mameluke period (1260-1516) began with the capture of Jerusalem from the Ayyubids in 1250. Italian Jews, who immigrated to Jerusalem in the fifteenth century, complained bitterly in letters about the lack of security measures taken by the Mamelukes to protect them from attacks by Bedouin tribes. Moreover, they were frequently persecuted by the Mameluke rulers; for example, the desecration of a temple in 1474. In the fifteenth century, approximately 200 Jewish families inhabited Jerusalem. The attachment of the Jews to Jerusalem, thus, has transcended time and reason. Throughout this period, Jerusalem was the center of Jewish life, and as such, it was destined to play an even greater role after it fell into Ottoman hands.

The Ottomans governed Jerusalem from 1517 to 1917. In the early 16th century, many renowned Kab-balists such as Abraham ben Eliezer Yehuda ha-Levi settled in Jerusalem, which was clearly the spiritual center of Judaism. Jews from Turkey, North Africa, and Western Europe immigrated to Jerusalem during this period. In 1622, the distinguished author Isaiah Horowitz founded a Jewish community in Jerusalem which was composed of Sephardim, Ashkenazim, Italians, Maghrabis, and Karaites. In 1625, Governor Muhammad ibn Farrauck began to persecute the Jews, an account of which was later detailed in the pamphlet, Horvot Yerushalayim.

There is no doubt that the establishment of the Zionist movement in 1893 was an historic turning point in the life of the Jews. The name of the movement itself was coined by Nathan Birnbaum after the word "Zion," which was another biblical name for Jerusalem. The return to Zion became the cornerstone of the movement, which has experienced many trials and tribulations before it could materialize its dream.

Although some of the Zionist leaders, including Theodor Herzl, were not cognizant either of the name or its implication, they soon came to realize that no location other than the land of Israel, with Jerusalem at its center, could fulfill Jewish yearning, hopes, and dreams. Religious Zionism, thus, was incorporated into a political ideology of which Jerusalem was the core.

The British governed Jerusalem during the years 1917-1948. After the battle near Sheikh Jarrah, the Turks conceded defeat. Sir Herbert Samuel served as high commissioner of Jerusalem, whose population of 62,578 was over half Jewish. Jews served on Jerusalem's Municipal Council. Headquarters for the Zionist Executive, the Keren Hayesod, the Jewish National Fund, the National Council of the Yishuv, and the Chief Rabbinate were established in Jerusalem. The British rule of Jerusalem, however, was no more benevolent than that of its predecessors. During Yom Kippur Services at the Western Wall in 1928, the British police angered Jewish worshippers by removing a religious screen separating the men from the women. Shortly thereafter, the British began constructing buildings near the city wall, which the Jews considered an intentional intrusion on their prayer. After the British withdrew from Jerusalem in May 1948 following Israeli statehood, Jordanian and Palestinian Arabs attacked the Jewish quarters of the Old City. Fighting continued until the Jews surrendered. East Jerusalem and the West Bank were captured by the Jordanians, while the Jews held West Jerusalem. The remaining Jews in the Old City were expelled by the Jordanians.

The city remained divided from 1948 to 1967. The Arabs destroyed the ancient Jewish quarter of East Jerusalem, including 34 of the 35 synagogues (Hurvah, Nisan, Bak, etc.) and the Jewish schools. Moreover, they also desecrated the ancient and beloved Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. Hostile Arabs surrounded the Jewish sector of Jerusalem from the north, east, and south. Jordan formally annexed East Jerusalem in 1951–also in defiance of its international obligations, though only Pakistan and Britain recognized that claim.

For 19 years, Jews were forbidden to worship at the Western Wall, and indeed Moslems and Christians coming from Israeli Jerusalem were severely restricted in their access to holy places. During the Jordanian occupation of East Jerusalem, constant efforts were made by both Israel and such international organizations as the U.N. to find an amicable solution that would allow Jews freedom to worship at the Western Wall. However, the Jordanian officials, in defiance of the U.N. ceasefire agreement of 1948 and of international law which guarantees freedom of worship, consistently refused to allow any Jews access to any sector of East Jerusalem.

In the Six-Day War of June, 1967 when the war against Syria and Egypt was almost won, the late Prime Minister Levi Eshkol pleaded with King Hussein of Jordan to refrain from entering the conflict. At no time had Eshkol's government contemplated the recapture of East Jerusalem by force or any other means. Although a Jewish return to East Jerusalem was seen as a necessary, sacred act, the Israeli government hoped that Jewish rights would ultimately be restored through negotiation.

However, against the advice of his generals, King Hussein decided to enter the Six-Day War. Within three days of the outbreak of hostilities against West Jerusalem, East Jerusalem fell into the hands of the Israelis, who were determined to avoid any damage to any part of the city, even at the expense of increased Israeli casualties. No Arab holy shrines were touched by the advancing Israeli army. Now that East Jerusalem was finally under Jewish rule, the Israeli government and people were determined never again to allow the desecration of Jewish holy places and the division of East and West Jerusalem.

The decision to reunite Jerusalem was thus based not only on a psychological and emotional affinity, but also on hopes and perhaps most important–on religious and historical rights that were not subject to dispute. The recapture and the annexation of Jerusalem were based on conditions determined by the course of events.

The city that had been time and again usurped from the Jews was finally united. Since 1967, the reunification of Jerusalem has given tangible expression to all values which are cherished by man and were so befitting the uniqueness of the city. The Israeli authorities opened the city to freedom of worship, freedom of movement, and freedom of expression. For the first time in 19 years, the holy places were opened to visitors of all three faiths, and it has remained that way since 1967. In fact, no guardians of the holy places have ever before been so permissive in granting access to worshippers.

Immediately following the annexation of the Old City, all residents of Jerusalem became eligible for Israeli citizenship. Israel was particularly sensitive to avoiding any socio-economic and political measures that might adversely affect any segment of the population. The concept of human rights, equality, and mutual respect were the order of the day, and they have been translated in every action that the authorities have taken.

It is most unfortunate that because of political and economic expediency, the international community has not as yet demonstrated the ability to understand and accept the Israeli position. Those countries, especially the U.S., which enjoy considerable political leverage in the Middle East and are directly and indirectly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, could render a far greater service to the cause of peace by accepting the Israeli position on Jerusalem. In all likelihood, Israel would be more flexible on the Palestinian issue–including a dialogue with the PLO–if the U.S. were to recognize, in principle, the inviolability of a united Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

At a minimum, the U.S. could begin, through quiet diplomacy, to persuade the Arab mainstream, especially Saudi Arabia, that Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem is unequivocal and unshakable. Israel will not relinquish its control over East Jerusalem voluntarily or through negotiations. To be sure, if the British would consider negotiating the status of London, the French the status of Paris, and finally, if the U.S. will accept the internationalization of New York, Boston, or Los Angeles, then Israel might be willing to reconsider its position on Jerusalem.

In short, Jerusalem is an integral part not only of Israel as a nation, but of every Jewish soul. Jerusalem is the very essence of every Jew. It is his being, his present, his past, without which he has no future. Jerusalem is all that a Jew wants to feel, touch, dream of, pray for, reach out, reach in, live in, and die for. Jerusalem, the hope for return to Jerusalem, were the main sources of strength and force that have guided and guarded the Jews throughout their dispersion. In this sense, Jerusalem is unique; it is the rock upon which the world's oldest nationalism was built.

History, as we have seen, reveals no other people so completely and irrevocably fused to a single place, and no centuries of exile, persecution, or any ruler's edict has been able to sever that attachment. "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,…," sang the Psalmist, and the Jews have never forgotten. Nor have they forgotten nor should anyone else forget that long before Jerusalem became sacred to Christianity, it was holy to the Jews; that before Jerusalem was identified as the mystical destination of Mohammed's Night Journey and his visit to God's Presence, it was consecrated by the People of Israel.

Indeed, had it not been so, Jerusalem could not have played such a key role in the histories of either Islam or Christianity. Without Jerusalem, there can be no state of Israel, and Israel's enemies know this only too well. To consign Jerusalem to Arab rule again, or to place it under some vague "international" regime, is to invite a replay of the malicious destruction and wholesale desecration of Jewish holy places that took place under the 19 years of Jordanian rule.

It is perhaps worth asking what the world would have said had Israel in 1948 captured East Jerusalem, destroyed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the mosques of Omar and El Aksa, then denied Christians and Moslems access to their holy places. Yet for 19 years the world remained aloof and uninterested while the Arabs made East Jerusalem judenrein and destroyed, looted, and desecrated synagogues and cemeteries.

In the context of peace negotiations, the eventual status of Jerusalem may turn out to be much easier to deal with than many political observers of the Arab-Israeli scene have thought. Although from the Israeli viewpoint, the status of united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is not negotiable, the juridical status of non-Jews, particularly Palestinians residing in Jerusalem, is open to discussion, as is the institutional framework within which that status is exercised in united Jerusalem.

As stated by Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek (in Foreign Affairs, winter 1988-1989), "There is room for functional divisions of authority, for internal autonomy of each community and for functional sovereignty." The Israelis understand that the permanent unification of East and West Jerusalem must not jeopardize the Arabs' absolute right to direct their cultural and religious affairs without Israeli interference.

The issue of Jerusalem and its final status, thus, transcends both the Israelis' and the Palestinians' political positions. World Jewry, and most certainly the Arab-Moslem world, will not relinquish its right to worship freely and administer its own holy shrines. In this respect, Israel has made itself very clear both in words and in deeds. The right of free access to and worship at the holy places sacred to Jews, Moslems, Christians, and other religious communities is inviolable whether these places are located in Jerusalem and other Israeli locations, or in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. What has been the practice in Israel for the last 22 years will become a part of the peace agreement between the two sides.

Any present-day visitor to Jerusalem's holy places can attest to the fact that Moslems, as well as any other religious group, have total and completejurisdiction over their holy places. Of course, consistent with the requirement of public safety, Israel has taken every precaution to insure that no individual or group can ever interfere with worship at or in the administration of the holy shrines. The Israelis will go to any lengths to demonstrate that the status of united Jerusalem, as Israel's capital, will be consistent with the Arab right to administer Moslem shrines.

Thus, the Palestinians living in Jerusalem might opt for any political status consistent with these aims: for example, some might choose: a) Israeli citizenship, as many have done already; b) citizenship in the Palestinian entity when one is established, or c) some other status provided under the terms of the settlement, including Jordanian citizenship or even some kind of dual citizenship (e.g. Palestinian-Israeli, Palestinian-Jordanian, etc.).

The pages of history are filled with pain, misery, and the hardship of the Jewish people who perished defending Jerusalem. The years of suffering, despair, persecution, and death, however, have not broken Jewish resistence, weakened their will, or compromised their resolve to rebuild Jerusalem and make it both the symbol and real tenet of Jewish redemption. Perhaps for these reasons, no ruler of Jerusalem throughout its long and sometimes gloomy or glorious history has ever treated Jerusalem and its residents with such benevolence as the Israelis currently treat the denizens of the city, be they Arab, Jew, or Christian.

Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem is not negotiable. While Israelis may differ politically on every other issue, regarding concessions for peace they are firmly and unequivocally united in their stand on Jerusalem. To be sure, Israelis would rather perish than be denied Jerusalem again. Whether Jerusalem was saved by the Jews or the Jews were saved by Jerusalem is hardly relevant. The fact remains that both have withstood the test of time and have defied all adversities to reunite again.

These sentiments have been expressed in countless ways throughout the centuries. To those unimpeachable voices I would like to add my own:

JERUSALEM AND I

Was I meant to be
myself
or the one who was supposed to be
and yet never was?
If I am who I am
and not who I could be -
then where am I? and
where should I be?
With you, Jerusalem, I am
who I was meant to be.
Without you, I am
nothing.

When I hear the music of peace
I hear the melodies of Jerusalem.
When I search for a place of comfort,
all roads take me to Jerusalem.
And when beauty saturates my soul
I know it is the unique beauty of Jerusalem.
When grief and desolation engulf me,
Jerusalem is there to console me.
When I teach or preach,
I pursue the knowledge of Jerusalem.
And when I reach for God
I reach for the God of Jerusalem.

Usurp or divide Jerusalem again,
and you might as well
kill my soul,
dismember my body,
cut off my arms,
behead me;
for I will be nothing,
I will sense nothing,
I will decay and die,
For Jerusalem is I.

I have seen
my brothers and sisters
dying, despairing, asking
Why?
Children cowering in fear and terror
not knowing what struck them
and why?
Yes, fathers and mothers
died in vain and hopelessness,
wondering, Why?
Why, in the name of God
they ever lived!

Remove your bloody masks,
you hypocritical creatures.
What do you know
about Jerusalem and me?
I lived there a millennia
before you arose
and I will survive millennia
after you fall.
I am the victim.
Suffering pain and agony,
misery, fear and tyranny,
torture, persecution and death.
But Jerusalem lives,
has lived through the ugly pages
and infamous chapters of history
that you have written and played.

Remove your dirty disguise,
for Jerusalem and I
have a bond,
unshakable, unstained,
never to be broken;
a bond
stronger than your most ominous arsenals,
mightier than your deadliest weapons;
a bond
profound, pervading and pure.
And thus
never again
would I capitulate or desert,
never again would I abandon or surrender.
For I am Jerusalem
and Jerusalem is I.

PLO chief Yasir Arafat's recognition of Israel's right to exist, his renunciation of violence in all forms, and his acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, as inexplicit as they may be, constitute a major turning point in relations between the two sides. Arafat's acceptance of these conditions did not just occur overnight in Algiers or Geneva. The road that Arafat had to traverse over 25 years was long and treacherous. It took five wars and tens of thousands of casualties to finally force Arafat to conclude that only peace with Israel can secure the Palestinians' national aspirations.

Although there are still a number of Syrian-backed factions within the PLO that harbor ill designs against Israel, one critical factor has emerged: during the last 25 years, the PLO has evolved, very gradually and very painfully, from a loose alliance of terrorist organizations into a political movement. The transformation was both difficult and costly in human and material resources. However, after decades of advocating the destruction of Israel, the PLO finally conceded Israel's existence because the alternative would have been nothing less than self-inflicted destruction, dislocation, and helplessness.

There are a number of factors that contributed to the PLO's move to its present political posture. Those Israelis who dismiss the PLO's recent diplomatic overtures as merely a "monumental effort in public deception" are willfully blinding themselves not only to the PLO's political evolution but to the development of a whole new set of political, military, and strategic conditions that have dramatically changed the political landscape of the Middle East.

The issue of a two-state solution is no longer a rhetorical one. If the PLO adheres to its public declarations regarding Israel's right to exist and the renunciation of terrorism, Israel and the U.S. will eventually find it difficult not to meet Palestinian demands. Moreover, the realities on the ground and the international climate will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for either Israel or the PLO to abandon diplomatic efforts.

The question that remains is whether the leadership of all countries concerned will rise to the occasion and seize the opportunity to translate the newly emerging consensus for peaceful coexistence into real peace. There are at least five main factors which not only provide the rationale behind the PLO's "change of heart," but suggest why it is unlikely that the PLO would readily change course during the search for a settlement.

Israeli Military Power

Military and political experts share the view that Israel's formidable military capacity has had a profound impact on the evolution of the PLO and the changing attitude of the Arab states toward Israel. Despite the Arab states' overwhelming numerical military superiority, which includes every category of weapons systems, Israel has maintained a tactical and strategical superiority that cannot be overcome by sheer numbers of soldiers or weapons.

If the repeated humiliation of the Arab states' armies in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 was not enough, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which resulted in the stunning defeat of the PLO, shattered any glimmer of hope among the PLO's rank and file that Israel could ever be defeated militarily. Despite the existence of extreme factions within and outside the PLO which still believe in the military option, the Palestinians, by and large, have resigned themselves to Israel's military preponderance and therefore, to its permanent presence.

One other critical factor related to the military equation is the United States' commitment to Israel's security. For many years, the Arab states attempted to drive a wedge between Israel and America. Realizing U.S. strategic and economic interests in the Middle East, the Arab states–particularly Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states–have tried in vain to lure or force the U.S. away from Israel. In the course of years, the U.S. made it clear in words and in deeds that it would not sacrifice Israel's interest to gain the Arab states' favor. Moreover, the U.S. finds no inconsistencies between maintaining Israel's security and developing friendship and close military and economic ties with moderate Arab states.

The fact that the U.S., under both Republicans and Democrats, consistently maintained its financial and military support for Israel provided a clear picture of where the U.S. stood. Moreover, U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation has further cemented the special relationship between the two countries. The U.S. commitment to Israel's security has thus become a permanent feature of American military and political strategy in the Middle East, one that no Arab country, let alone the PLO, could minimize or ignore.

This, of course, helps explain why the PLO desperately sought U.S. recognition and why they felt triumphant when the U.S. finally, after 13 years, accepted it as a negotiating partner in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The prevailing feeling among the PLO leadership is that the U.S. is the only country capable of exerting leverage over Israel and therefore, it is only the U.S. that can "persuade" Israel to make the necessary concessions. Regardless of the accuracy of the PLO's assessment of U.S. influence over Israel, the U.S. decision to begin a dialogue with the PLO is destined to have a profound impact on the future of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty

There is a clear consensus among most political observers that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was a major catalyst behind Middle East events of the 1980's. Although many Palestinians were extremely slow to admit it, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had a dramatic cumulative psychological impact on the Palestinian attitude toward Israel. Since 1979, many Palestinians and some Arab states, in particular Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Yemen, have worked diligently to undermine the treaty. Egypt, however, withstood the pressure and although it was ousted from the Arab league, the Egyptians, under the leadership of President Hosni Mubarak, stayed the course, believing that in the final analysis, the only viable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be achieved through negotiations and peace.

Although Egyptian support for the Palestinians was consistent and clear, the Egyptians did not hesitate to subordinate the Palestinian cause to their own national interest and were determined not to allow the PLO to undermine Egyptian-Israeli peace. During the course of the following 10 years, the PLO gradually came to the conclusion that the Egyptian act of peacemaking could not be reversed. Moreover, Jordan, which continues to be the interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, had long since abandoned the military option, as well. Syria, which was prepared to support the continuation of a tactical military option against Israel and wanted to dominate the PLO, did not enjoy either the military or political leverage to make that option workable.

Thus, Arafat gradually came to the conclusion that by joining the Arab mainstream he stood a far better chance to advance the Palestinian cause. The Arab League conference in Amman in November 1987, vindicated the Egyptian act of peacemaking. Egypt was admitted back into the Arab League. The earlier demand to sever any relationship with Israel as a price for membership was dropped. The Arab countries were allowed to restore their diplomatic relations with Egypt. During the last 12 months, Egypt not only restored diplomatic relations with the rest of the Arab states, but again became the center of political activity in the Arab world and in all likelihood the catalyst behind the next peace offensive.

It was Mubarak who worked very diligently to persuade Arafat to finally adopt a moderate posture. At the same time, Mubarak positioned himself between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Arafat, ensuring that the PLO leader met all U.S. conditions. The meeting between Mubarak, Hussein, and Arafat in Aqaba in October 1988, clearly signaled the PLO's future fortunes in relation to the rest of the Arab states and its agreement to pursue the political option with Israel.

The Jordanian Connection

For historic, geographic, demographic, strategic, and security reasons Jordan will continue to play a major role in any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The fact that Jordan has maintained a peaceful coexistence with Israel since 1967 has had a subtle but profound impact on the Palestinian national movement. The West Bank was never legally Jordanian territory, and Jordan itself was part– albeit a separate part–of the British Mandate of Palestine until it became independent in 1946.

During the 1948 War of Independence, Jordan occupied the West Bank, and in 1951, officially annexed it by declaring Jordan's sovereignty over these territories. Since the rest of the Arab states and the U.N. did not object or demand the restoration of these territories to other claimants, a fait accompli was successfully achieved. During the following 19 years, the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Jordanians developed very close ties. Because all Palestinians east and west of the Jordan River gained equal civil liberties, they generally acquiesced to a set of conditions which neither suppressed nor encouraged Palestinian nationalism.

Israel's capture of the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967, drastically altered the picture. Under Israeli rule, Palestinian nationalism assumed a more active posture and evoked an intense debate in regional and international forums. From 1967 to 1977, Israel's Labor Party sought to resolve the Palestinian question through the "Jordanian connection," reasoning that Israel could neither annex these territories (in fear that the subsequent demographic imbalance would obliterate Israel's Jewish character), nor relinquish the West Bank (in fear of the possible creation of a Palestinian state committed to Israel's destruction). As a result, the idea of a territorial compromise with Jordan gained strength with Israel's ruling Labor circles.

Between 1967 and 1977, Jordan maintained an unofficial peace with Israel. King Hussein was prepared, at least in principle, to accept limited territorial concessions, provided that most of the occupied territories be reincorporated eventually into Jordan proper. What finally undermined the Israeli-Jordanian dialogue was the growing strength of the Palestinian national movement.

In 1974, two international statements were issued which, in effect, dealt the Jordanian option a near-fatal blow: (1) In April 1974, in Rabat, Morocco, the Arab League passed a resolution which proclaimed that the PLO was to inherit all territories evacuated by Israel, and (2) in October 1974, U.N. Resolution 2310, which recognized the PLO as the "sole representative" of the Palestinian people, was passed, the two resolutions had an unintended consequence (at least for the Arabs): by denying Hussein the incentive to continue the struggle to regain the West Bank, they effectively distanced Jordan from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Hussein's refusal to enter the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations under U.S. auspices, or even endorse the Camp David accords, was based on his assumption that Jordan had little to gain from the enterprise. Hussein also calculated, at the time, that if Jordan entered the negotiations prematurely, it would forfeit its "right" to regain control over the West Bank. Moreover, the Palestinians, led by the PLO, were committed to political independence, having rejected (at least temporarily ) any connection with Jordan. They could hardly forget "Black September," the bloody 1970 Jordanian civil war which left more than 10,000 Palestinians dead and drove 150,000 refugees into Lebanon.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's 1979 autonomy plan offered no new prospects for Jordan. In fact, Begin rejected the principle of territorial compromise–like his predecessors, he viewed Jordan as a Palestinian state already in the being. What role could Jordan play then under such circumstances? Simply put, Jordan stood to gain nothing unless the Palestinians and Israelis first recognized each other's right to exist and a mutual understanding was reached regarding the future political and administrative status of the West Bank. Only then could the Jordanian connection be revived, as the Camp David Accords themselves envisioned.

Since the accords were signed the fortunes of the PLO and, subsequently, those of the Palestinians have changed dramatically. The 1982 PLO defeat in Lebanon at the hands of the Israelis was also, at least temporarily, a personal setback for Arafat. Although he was still recognized as the head of the PLO, his personal prestige and political base were seriously eroded. Having been accused by the Syrian-backed radical terrorist groups of showing moderation toward Israel, Arafat once again became dependent on the political support and good will of moderate Arab countries.

By the end of 1983, Hussein was regarded as the only major Arab player with any leverage over the future of the Palestinians, although his enhanced role did not grant him a complete mandate to negotiate on their behalf. Once again, Hussein was able to position himself at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian equation, particularly if peace, and not war, emerged as an alternative. Moreover, the open–though unsuccessful–negotiations in the winter of 1985 between Hussein and Arafat regarding talks with Israel further strengthened Hussein's hand.

Indeed, it was Hussein who called for an international peace conference, something to which the PLO could not object since it had itself called for one earlier. What is significant about the Hussein-Arafat talks is that it was the first time that the PLO engaged in political discussions regarding peace with Israel. From that point on, the PLO, in principle, abandoned the military option and began to pursue the political option.

The fact that the Arab League summit held in Amman in November 1987, hardly discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinian issue, suggested for the first time that the Arab states, by their actions, openly admitted that "… pride and passion aside, the Arabs' conflict with Israel is essentially peripheral to most of them." By focusing their attention on the threat posed by Iran's revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab leaders, in effect, endorsed Hussein's central role in future negotiations with Israel and the Palestinians. While the summit did pass a resolution that implied the PLO's right to a separate delegation at a Middle East conference, it also left the door open to a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and kept intact Hussein's key role in convening such a conference.

The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which erupted on December 9, 1987, one month after the Amman conference, introduced a new and vital element into the Jordanian-PLO political relationship. The leadership of the uprising demanded action from the PLO, making the Palestinian national claim the core issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, the leadership of the uprising was able, in a matter of six months, to define the Arab-Israeli conflict and reduce it to its basic element–Palestinian national aspirations for a homeland. Arafat, sensing an historic opportunity to project himself into the center of the Palestinian political agenda emerging from the territories, seized the opportunity.

The Algiers conference of Arab heads of state in June 1988, convened at the strong urging of the PLO, changed much of the thrust and intent of the earlier resolution adopted in Amman in November 1987. The Arab League reaffirmed the PLO's role as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the PLO was given direct and exclusive responsibility for the uprising.

Totally frustrated with the Israelis, the PLO, and the uprising, King Hussein finally decided on July 31, to disengage Jordan from its administrative and legal ties to the West Bank and Gaza. Thus with one stroke the King gave the PLO the final push into the political equation, forced Israel to rethink its options and maneuvered the U.S. into reconsidering its relationship to the PLO and to the entire peace process.

Terrorism Runs its Course

The international community's changing attitude toward terrorism, an attitude which now leads to condemnation of terrorist activity regardless of the "legitimacy" of the causes being pursued, was another important factor that contributed to the PLO's evolution. Historically, and of necessity, terrorism cannot be employed simply as an end in itself. Moreover, repeated indiscriminate acts of terrorism tend to be counterproductive–they lead to antipathy for the terrorist rather than sympathy for his cause.

Between 1974 and 1982, the PLO and its splinter surrogates intensified the export of terrorist activities to the West. They hoped to attract further attention to the Palestinian cause and to make up for their failure to terrorize Israel itself. However, effective Israeli counter-terrorism measures, coupled with a cooperative (though belated) Western effort to meet the common threat of terrorism, compelled the PLO to find other ways of dealing with Israel. At first the international community, especially Western Europe, absorbed the terrorist blows one by one without having the courage to take collective anti-terrorist measures. Each country–Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain–tried to deal with the problem by itself, as if the terrorism each faced was an isolated phenomenon, unconnected to that suffered by its neighbors and the rest of the world. It was not until 1985 that the Western countries finally decided to cooperate and deal with it as a common threat to their civil order.

Ironically, and paradoxically, continued terrorist activities against European and American targets also dangerously compromised the Palestinian cause and made a mockery of the PLO's "national aspirations." Western Europe and the United States finally agreed that terrorism had to be stopped regardless of its origin. The orgy of violence seemed to be both more common and more tragic: the brutal killing of the American sailor aboard the hijacked TWA plane in Lebanon; the murder of Leon Klinghoffer on the hijacked Italian cruise ship the Achille Lauw, the bombing of the discotheque in West Germany; the multiple kidnappings of Americans and Europeans; the assassinations of diplomats in England, France, Germany; and the disastrous bombing of the American barracks in Lebanon in which 241 American Marines were killed. In the end, as the carnage increased, it became more and more difficult to see the connection between the slaughter of innocents and the Palestinian cause.

Such indiscriminate use of terror has almost completely alienated not only those who were directly affected by it, but also the PLO's best friends. Even the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies found they could no longer condone terrorism as a means to aid the Palestinian cause.

The predicament of the Palestinians, and especially that of the PLO, was how to reconcile the difference between the various radical factions that still believed in the military option and growing moderate factions that realized the futility of continued violence and were now committed to a political solution. While an ideological and leadership schism continued to haunt the PLO one fact became clear: in the course of the last decade, the PLO has been compelled to transform itself from a loose alliance of armed groups emphasizing the use of violence into a quasi-political movement largely pursuing its aims through diplomatic rather than terroristic means.

It also became clear that the international community's changing attitudes toward terrorism has helped to force this new posture upon the organization. This, however, does not mean that we have seen the end of terrorism. It means that the PLO has come to the conclusion that terrorism can no longer be employed as a tool to promote the national aspirations of Palestinians. Thus, Arafat's renunciation of terrorism in all forms was, in fact, nothing more than acceptance of the inevitable, unless the PLO was prepared to lose all the ground it had gained as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian struggle for national identity. All this, of course, doesn't mean that all Middle East generated terrorism has run its course, as the horror of Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988 reminds us.

The Uprising

As the PLO began in earnest to change both its image and its operational code in 1987 and early 1988, it was forced once again to respond to events over which it had little or no control, but which could deeply affect its prospects and actions. In November 1987, the Amman Arab League summit gave King Hussein still greater leverage over Palestinian participation in a future peace conference, underlining both the PLO's renewed dependence on its Arab hosts and patrons, and the failure of its campaign of terrorism.

In December 1987, the uprising of Arab youth in Gaza and the West Bank, supported by nearly all of Israel's Arab citizens, forcefully reminded the PLO that ultimately it was the Palestinians in Israel and the administered territories–not those on the outside–who would decide the fate of the Palestinian community as a whole. Though there was some evidence of limited outside instigation involved in the riots in Gaza and the West Bank, what happened clearly took place against the advice of, and despite, the counsels of restraint by local Palestinian elders and their political organizations. The young Palestinians certainly shouted PLO slogans as they threw rocks and gasoline bombs at the Israeli soldiers, but it is obvious that they–the young Palestinians–represent a new force over which the PLO has only limited control. Among the messages sent by the Palestinians' continued cycle of riots was undoubtedly one to the PLO itself: take the initiative in finding a solution to the Palestinian problem, or lose your ability to affect events in the Palestinian homeland.

The PLO's insistence on assuming responsibility for the future course of the uprising provided a crucial turning point in the history of the evolution of the PLO. Inasmuch as it needs a critical vehicle through which it can complete its transformation from a terrorist organization into a political movement, the uprising provided the perfect medium. As an indigenous revolt against the occupier, the Palestinians in the territories provided the PLO with an opportunity and a challenge.

Arafat was quick to capitalize on the development of these events: (a) Jordan's decision to disengage administrative and legal ties to the territories, an action which thrust the PLO into the heart of the uprising, and (b) Israel's inability–though by choice–to squelch the uprising through the use of massive force. As a result, the Israelis were left with the options of either tolerating continued civil disorder and constant defiance of authority or a Palestinian massacre. Israel opted for the former. Thus, the uprising gave the PLO an historic opportunity to claim a victory and facilitated Arafat's next political move in Algiers, followed by his speech at the U.N. General Assembly in Geneva.

International Pressure

Mounting international pressure on both Israel and the Arab states, including the PLO, finally began to yield definitve results. Beause the U.S. and the Soviet Union do not see eye to eye on many regional conflicts and because they continue their rivalry for influence in many regions, the countries involved are generally compelled to follow the political and ideological line of their benefactors. However, since Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power East-West relations have taken on a more conciliatory and cooperative tone. Consequently, the political climate in many regions also began to respond to the changing mood in Washington and Moscow.

The end of the war between Iraq and Iran, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the cessation of hostilities in Angola and the growing manifestation of cooperation between the two superpowers provided a clear sense of departure from the period of the cold war. Obviously the Middle East was also subject to the influence of these manifestations of cooperation and the strong desire to end the bloodshed between the two peoples.

It is also clear that the international community, particularly the U.S. and the Soviet Union, has grown weary of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially since there is not much that can be changed in the conflict itself to provide either superpower further strategic or political leverage. Gorbachev felt strongly, however, that for the Soviet Union to play a constructive role it had to pressure the PLO to abandon the military option, seek a dialogue with the U.S. and recognize Israel's right to exist.

Moreover, because of the uprising there is a growing consensus that the Arab-Israeli crisis has finally been reduced to its true component: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The international community has long held the view that both Israel and the Palestinians have an equal right to self-determination.

What is important to note here is that from the international viewpoint, Israel's existence, established on the basis of the 1967 borders, must not negate the Palestinians' right to their own homeland and the creation of a Palestinian state must not be at the expense of Israel. The demographic, socio-economic, and geographic conditions on the ground support these propositions. As a result, even the U.S. finally came to the conclusion–the Reagan peace plan of 1982 which was reaffirmed in Geneva in December 1988–that Israel must withdraw from the bulk of territories captured in 1967 as a prerequisite to a settlement of the Palestinian people. As the PLO was moving closer to accepting U.N. Resolution 242, Western European countries, such as Britain, France, West Germany, and, of course, Sweden, used their influence to convince the PLO to yield to the American conditions. They, in turn, urged the U.S. to accept as adequate Arafat's statements regarding U.N. Resolution 242, the renunciation of terrorism and recognition of Israel.

Although the U.S. does not officially support the creation of an independent Palestinian state, it seems that eventually the U.S. too may come to the conclusion which predicates peace on coexistence under separate political authority or as it is termed, the two-state solution.

Long Move Toward Moderation

The U.S.'s decision to begin a diplomatic dialogue with the PLO may have "shocked and dismayed" the Israelis but it has finally put the Arab-Israeli conflict in its proper context. For 13 years, the U.S. lived up to its commitment not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless it explicitly accepted Israel's right to exist, renounced all forms of terrorism and accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 331. Arafat took 13 years to finally accept U.S. conditions. Whether or not a degree of ambiguity remained in Arafat's statement, what is important here is that the PLO has finally made the long expected public move toward moderation in which the acceptance of Israel's right to exist is central.

As a major power with high stakes in the Middle East, the U.S. had to seize the opportunity when it was presented. It was U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz who courageously denied Arafat an entry visa to the U.S. to address the U.N. General Assembly's convocation in Geneva. Yet, when it came time for a shift in policy, it took just as much courage to say yes to Arafat and earnestly begin a dialogue on peace.

The PLO must now translate its renunciation of terrorism and acceptance of Israel's right to exist into deeds. A growing number of Israelis (55% according to the latest poll) have come to the conclusion that the PLO must eventually be a party to any peace negotiations; there will be no peace between Israelis and Palestinians unless the PLO and Israel talk to each other and accept each other as legitimate parties to the dialogue.

Now that the PLO has accepted Israel's right to exist–at least on the surface–it behooves the new Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, to put the PLO to the test. Israel understandably feels suspicious and concerned; indeed, the PLO may or may not harbor future designs against Israel. Israel, however, cannot simply reject a dialogue with the PLO on the basis of old assumptions and suspicions. The PLO's intentions can be judged only through face-to-face negotiations. Israel, with its military preponderance and unshakable U.S. support, could certainly take this limited risk.

Israel, in cooperation with the U.S., should define acceptable parameters for negotiations with the PLO. At the same time, the U.S. will be in a position through its bilateral dialogue with the PLO to discern where, in fact, the PLO stands on various points and how much leverage there is between its maximalist position and what it will settle for. The U.S., as a major power and Israel's closest ally, is in a unique position to play an effective role in the peace process.

President Reagan's decision to open a dialogue with the PLO was timely and critical. The new Bush administration, which undoubtedly will remain committed to Israel's security and well-being, will want to take advantage of the recent dramatic developments and move the troubled Middle East closer to peace. Israel must not–nay cannot–afford to be perceived as the only obstacle to peace and thus isolate itself from the process. Prime Minister Shamir may yet emerge as the peacemaker. As 1988 came to a close, Jews, Arabs, and Christians looked up to Jerusalem and prayed for peace. There is a reason to be hopeful.